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 A Business Case Analysis for Upgrading the Current Aerial Reconnaissance Low 
(ARL) Fleet to the Q400 Aircraft 
 
Project Report:   
 This report identifies the potential benefits and costs of upgrading the current fleet 
of DHC-7 aircraft to the Q400.  We accomplish this through conducting an analysis of 
the Army’s current operational mission sets, the projected life cycle costs of each aircraft, 
and the alternative courses of action.  In addition, we utilize value engineering and 
feedback analysis tools to support the recommendations and findings.  Once complete, 
the final product from this research could be used as part of a future aerial requirements 
packet for the Aerial Common Sensors (ACS) program.  The Aerial Reconnaissance and 
Exploitation Sensors (ARES) program office, located at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, 
MD will receive the results of the research identifying the financial and performance 
benefits of purchasing the Q400.   
 
Background: 
 The DHC-7 currently conducts manned aerial reconnaissance missions for the 
U.S. Army.   The DHC-7s have limited operational usefulness due to their lack of power 
and payload capacity and its limited supply chain.  These limitations drive up 
maintenance costs and make this aircraft expensive to support through the year 2017.  A 
potential replacement for the DHC-7 is the newer Q400 Bombardier aircraft.  Our 
primary research objective is to conduct a side-by-side comparison of these aircraft to 
confirm or deny the following hypotheses:  
• After the upfront investment, the Q400 is a more efficient aircraft concerning 
the associated operating cost savings over its life cycle.   




 The following objectives shape our research methodology ensuring the relevant 
alternatives receive consideration and analysis: 
• Clearly identify the costs and benefits of replacing the existing aircraft with 
the newer Q400 aircraft from monetary and nonmonetary points of views. 
• Apply value-engineering techniques to analyze the case for  Army purchase of 
newer aircraft.   
a. Replace the current fleet of DHC-7s with fewer Q400s to maintain the 
same mission capability, or  
b. Replace the current fleet of DHC-7s with the same number of Q400s to 
increase mission capability.  
• Provide recommendations to the ACS program on the available courses of 
actions to assist with their decision-making on the future of the program.     
 
Recommendation: 
 The Army would realize cost, performance, future capability, and upgradability 
benefits by replacing its aging DHC-7 ARL fleet with the new Q400 aircraft.  In a one-
for-one comparison of performance, the Q400 equates to at least 1.3 DHC-7s and can 
perform the same mission objectives at 68% of the cost.  In terms of overall value to the 
Army and the intelligence user, the Q400 delivers almost twice the value of a DHC-7.   
 Upgrading the ARL fleet to Q400s will save the Army almost a half billion 
dollars over the next 20 years and an upgrade will pay for itself after just 13 years.  The 
net present value (NPV) of the Q400 investment is a positive $268 million with an 
internal rate of return (IRR) of 6.9%.  
 Therefore, it does not make economic sense for the Army to continue spending 
money on the DHC-7; it is an old and inefficient aircraft that the Army should consider 




 Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) products are crucial to the 
success of Department of Defense (DoD) operational missions.  The creation of these ISR 
products comes from a variety of complex sensors that are part of the airborne platforms.  
One such system employed by the U.S. Army is the Airborne Reconnaissance Low 
(ARL). 
 The Army requires multifunction day-or-night, all-weather ISR systems.  In an 
effort to keep acquisition and development costs to a minimum, the Army purchased used 
De Havilland of Canada (DHC) DHC-7s in 1991, and modified them to create a new 
ARL platform (Niemiec, 1996).  The ARL’s imagery and signals intelligence (IMINT 
and SIGINT) capability originally provided support to U.S. Southern Command 
(SOUTHCOM).  Due to its success in supporting SOUTHCOM, and the inability of the 
United States Air Force to meet standing commitments to provide radar coverage on the 
Korean peninsula, the Army continued to develop the ARL to support operations in U.S. 
Pacific Command (PACOM).  In 1996, United States Forces Korea (USFK) received 
three ARLs.  Their primary mission was to observe North Korean military activities and 
to replace the retiring OV-1D Mohawk fleet (Goebel, 2011). The ARL systems currently 
support the areas of responsibility for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. 
European Command.   
 Production of the DHC-7s began in 1975 and ended in 1988.  The production 
timeframe of the aircraft means that the Army’s fleet of ARLs is approaching an average 
age of 30 years per aircraft.  The operations and support (O&S) costs are high and are 
continuing to increase as the aircraft ages.    Spare parts are difficult to obtain, and, as a 
result, contracted mechanics must obtain and install individually milled parts, which is an 
expensive process.  Although the ARL’s design supports product improvements and 
upgrades, the aging DHC-7 platform is experiencing increased costs to maintain full 
mission capability.  The bottom line is that trying to do payload upgrades on an aging 
platform may not be the most cost-effective solution for the Army.   
 4 
 As the DoD and the Army implement their strategy to providing better 
intelligence capabilities to support the warfighter, the Army is reviewing current ISR 
platforms and deciding what future capabilities they need to retain. In keeping with a 
low-cost and minimal-development acquisition plan, the Army should consider other 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) aircraft as possible DHC-7 replacements.  In addition 
to retaining the capability to execute the current ARL mission, a replacement aircraft 
should have the ability to host an upgraded ISR sensor suite.   
 The estimated expiration year date of the DHC-7 ARL fleet is 2020; however, the 
fact that they can still fly does not necessarily make them a wise use of resources.  This 
business case analysis (BCA) compares the DHC-7 to the Bombardier Q400 and 
examines the possible performance benefits obtained with newer, more reliable, more 
efficient, and more capable aircraft.  This BCA also reviews and highlights the life cycle 
costs (LCC) and the economic value of making a decision to upgrade the fleet on a one-




A. KEY ISSUES WITH THE CURRENT ARL SYSTEM 
 As stated in the introduction, the Army faces ongoing maintenance issues and 
increasing O&S costs with the current ARL platform.  Due to these rising O&S costs, the 
Army is considering a potential replacement for the DHC-7.  In addition to rising costs, 
the Army should also consider the DHC-7’s performance issues.  The following section 
highlights in more detail the key concerns that the Army has with the DHC-7.     
 Loiter Time.  The loiter duration for the DHC-7 is generally seven to eight hours, 
while the preferred duration is 10 hours (Cook, 2011). During combat operations, units 
might be required to surge 24 hours a day, which cannot be done with three DHC-7 
aircraft. 
 Maintenance.  One Army unit that operates the DHC-7 recently reported an 
average maintenance cancellation rate of 15–20% (Cook, 2011).  This high cancellation 
rate results from age of the aircraft and the aviation problems associated with older 
aircraft and from limited repair and maintenance resources.  Additionally, a 2001 case 
study on the ARL’s life cycle logistics highlighted the difficulty in recruiting qualified 
mechanics for the DHC-7.  The study stated, “DHC-7 mechanics are aging along with the 
airframes.  Many of the contractor’s technical personnel have retired…or simply have 
chosen not to undergo the hardships that are currently associated with the ARL program” 
(Maples, 2001, p. 31).  According to this report, the Aviation and Missile Life Cycle 
Management Command had to reduce DHC-7 specific experience requirements to 
expand the pool of potential mechanics.  The selection of mechanics relied on whether or 
not they had equivalent aircraft maintenance experience and their ability to receive on-
the-job training to qualify them as DHC-7 mechanics (Maples, 2001, p. 32). 
 The Maples study also reported on the struggle to keep the aircraft’s components 
up-to-date.  The ARL underwent multiple, expensive modifications in order to update its 
technology.  These modifications “often complicate[d] wiring and interface connections 
to the aircraft” (Maples, 2001, p. 32), in effect making the process more costly.   
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 These maintenance issues are systemic and inherent to the aging DHC-7.  The 
older the aircraft, the more difficult (and more expensive) it is to maintain the aircraft and 
increase its reliability.  For the Army to increase the ARL’s reliability and, in effect, its 
operational availability, the Army must be willing to pay higher O&S costs. 
 Engine Service Ceiling.  The service ceiling of the DHC-7 is 18,000 feet, but if 
one of its four engines fails, the pilot must drift down significantly in altitude to 13,000 
feet.  As a result, the aircraft cannot operate in warm locations with mountains above 
8,000 feet due to its one-engine-out service ceiling.  DHC-7s operating in Afghanistan 
can only fly in the flat southern desert due to the low minimum obstruction clearance 
altitude (MOCA) and the immediate vicinity of Kandahar.  The low one-engine-out 
service ceiling marginalizes the potential impact on targeting operations because the 
aircraft cannot operate where the majority of the target deck flights are located.  When 
supporting SOUTHCOM operations, the DHC-7 can only fly on the eastern side of the 
Andes Mountains. 
 In addition, because of its operating weight of 44,000 pounds, an ARL takes 
almost an hour to climb to 18,000 feet (Viking Air, 2001).  The service ceiling decrease 
can be a critical constraint when planning missions in mountainous areas.     
 Noise.  The noise of the aircraft can disrupt missions, particularly those that 
require lower altitude reconnaissance so that the cameras can operate below cloud decks.  
The noise of the aircraft could potentially identify its location to ground elements.  In 
addition, multiple noise-level-related airspace prohibitions exist in densely populated 
areas.   
 Overall Aircraft Service Life.  The age of the aircraft, the fact that DHC-7s are no 
longer in production and that only a small number are still in operation globally, directly 
affects the ability of the aircraft to remain mission capable.    
 Few Operational DHC-7s Worldwide. As of 2004, approximately 60 serviceable 
DHC-7s were in operation.  The case study of the ARL’s life cycle logistics identified 
DHC-7 “obsolescence” (Maples, 2001, p. 32) as a problem for the Department of the 
Army.  At the time of the publication of that study, the Army was the primary user of the 
aircraft.  The study also reported “the original equipment manufacturer and other civilian 
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contractors who work with the aircraft  [were] making attempts to re-engineer, re-
manufacture and/or redesign parts that are no longer available” (Maples, 2001, p. 33). 
B. BACKGROUND OF THE AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE LOW (ARL)  
 The Development. The Army developed the ARL system (also referred to as the 
O-5, EO-5A/B/C, RC-7, and DHC-7) in response to joint urgent operational needs 
statements (JUONS) and the requirement to establish a platform for common aerial 
sensors.  The need to sustain and build an enduring ARL capability is a requirement 
identified by the Joint Direct-Support Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (JDSAISR) Initial Capabilities Document (ICD).   
 History.  The ARL system developed from a SOUTHCOM requirement for a 
manned aviation platform that could provide an IMINT and SIGINT collection 
capability.  The ARL program officially began in November 1990 when the Army 
purchased used DHC-7s from civilian carriers.  The Army converted these aircraft into 
the ARL- Communication (C) version in 1993.  De Havilland of Canada developed the 
DHC-7 and the Army chose it as the platform for ARL because of its ability to carry the 
necessary sensors, its endurance and short take-off and landing (STOL) performance, and 
its multi-engine configuration.  It is an extensively modified aircraft; in particular, a 
higher maximum gross weight and extended range capability were additions during the 
ARL conversions.  It has the ability to pressurize and can operate at up to 18,000 feet 
with a full mission crew. Mission duration can be up to eight hours with a range of 1,100 
nautical miles at a maximum cruising speed of 231 knots, and the aircraft can loiter at a 
speed as low as 110 knots.  
 The design requirements stated that ARL should support nation building, counter-
narcotics operations, missions to promote democracy and stability and support operations 
in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility. The ARL systems began their support missions 
with SOUTHCOM in 1993 to assist in counter-drug surveillance operations and later 
deployed to Haiti in support of U.S. peacekeeping operations. In 1996, an ARL deployed 
to Bosnia-Herzegovina to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s peacekeeping 
force. 
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 Two different ARL configurations also deployed to SOUTHCOM. The ARL-C 
configuration has a conventional communication-intercept and direction-finding payload. 
The ARL-I, configuration has an imagery payload consisting of a forward-looking 
infrared (FLIR) sensor, an infrared line scanner (IRLS), and a daylight imagery system 
(DIS). The RC-7 met SOUTHCOM's requirements very well, and the Army soon 
requested a more advanced version, designated RC-7B or ARL-M, which merged the 
functionality of the ARL-C and the ARL-I. 
 In November 1995, in response to a USFK and PACOM requirement, the Army 
directed the additions of moving target indicator (MTI) and synthetic aperture radar 
(SAR) capabilities to the ARL-M so that it could replace the OV-1D Mohawk aircraft.  
The procurement of the MTI/SAR subsystem was successful and fielded two ARL-Ms in 
less than 10 months. 
 Operational Functions of the ARL.  The ARL program has three primary 
operational functions.  The first is to find enemy activity through broad-area searches 
within Named Area of Interests (NAI).  The second function is to fix on a target by 
providing more resolution of a specific target area, known as a Targeted Area of Interest 
(TAI).  The third operational function is to finish on the target through high-resolution 
imagery before and during mission execution.    
 ISR Capabilities.  Due to airframe age and dated technology, the ARL must rely 
on major modifications to accommodate new and diverse mission requirements.  The 
SIGINT subsystem uses an Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system that has a high 
frequency (HF), very-high frequency (VHF), and ultra-high frequency (UHF) intercept 
and direction-finding (DF) capabilities.  The IMINT subsystem equipment includes 
infrared- sensitive charge-coupled devices (CCD) embedded in the sensor ball, FLIR, and 
DIS. 
C. A TYPICAL ARL MISSION   
All of the Army’s ARL aircraft have the ARL-M modifications whose 
multifunction capabilities allow it to conduct both the SIGINT and IMINT missions.  The 
ARL-M has the capability to conduct several types of DF operations, including HF, VHF, 
and UHF.  Dissemination is through secure UHF (line-of-sight and SATCOM) or VHF 
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modulation communications. In addition, ARL-M can support three separate imagery 
systems on board through a first-generation, forward-looking infrared (IR) camera turret; 
a DIS camera turret; and an infrared-sensitive CCD embedded in the sensor ball.  The 
system can send RS-170 video imagery via downlink to COTS systems such as 
TACLINK II, which is a portable video receiver. Two onboard operators can record 
information on eight-millimeter videotape or transmit near-real-time data to the ground 
forces commander.  The aircraft also has a suite of Aircraft Survivability Equipment 
(ASE) suitable for countering enemy threats. 
D. THE DHC-7 
 Commercial Usage of DHC-7.  The DHC-7 originally flew as a commercial 
regional airliner, operating on intercity routes between major metropolitan areas from 
small local airports.  This requirement dictated good short-field capability and a low 
noise signature.  The DHC-7 met with only limited commercial success.  Most turboprop 
operators used these aircraft as feeders into large airports, where STOL performance was 
not a priority.  In comparison to other feeder liners, the DHC-7's four engines required 
twice the maintenance of a twin-engine model, thereby driving up operational costs.  
Figure 1 shows the dimensions of the DHC-7. 
 
Figure 1.   DHC-7 External Dimensions (From Aviastar, 1975) 
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 Current Situation.  As of 2011, eight ARL systems are flying and are in the ARL-
M configuration as well as a DHC-7 training aircraft. Four ARL-Ms are at Fort Bliss, 
Texas, and primarily support SOUTHCOM requirements; three ARL-Ms are in Korea 
supporting PACOM.  One additional aircraft is supporting CENTCOM.  
E. THE Q400 
 Commercial Usage of the Q400.  During the 1970s, De Havilland Canada 
officials began development of a commuter airliner with 30 to 40 seats called the DHC-8 
and used the DHC-7 as its basis.  The DHC-8 featured a larger airframe and twin engines.  
Bombardier has since bought out De Havilland Canada.  Currently over 1,000 DHC-8s of 
all models (-100 to -400) are in service, with Bombardier forecasting a total production 
run of 1,192 units of all variants through 2016.  The DHC-8-400, commonly referred to 
as the Q400, has the ability to conduct STOL operations.  With the Q400, Bombardier 
also focused on improving cruise performance and lowering operational costs.   
 The Q400s are less expensive to maintain due to only having two engines and 
being newer (in both airframe age and design). In fact, the Q400 has one of the lowest 
costs per passenger mile when compared to its direct competitors.  The Q400 is able to 
operate from small airports with 3,000-foot (910 m) runways.   
 The Selection of the Q400 as the Alternative Aircraft.  The DHC-8 and Q400 are 
already in service globally with other governments (see Figure 2).  The Aerial 
Reconnaissance and Exploitation Systems (ARES) program considered the Casa C-295, 
which is comparable to the DHC-7, but saw that the Casa C-295 sat too low to the ground 
for one of the required payloads (L. Ilse, personal communication, April 20, 2011).  The 
following paragraphs offer a brief view as to why the Q400 appears to be superior to the 
DHC-7.  Subsequent chapters will go into more detail and analysis.  
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Figure 2.   Countries Using Versions of the DHC-8  (From Bombardier, 2011) 
 Engine Power. The Q400 has a higher payload capacity, more power, and more 
endurance in the ARES configuration.  The Q400 has the Pratt & Whitney PW150A 
engine, which allows for lower fuel consumption and emissions, new technology 
materials and cooling, and a low parts count for reduced complexity and ease of 
maintenance.  The Q400 supports the DoD’s current financial goal of acquiring more 
efficient equipment (Weisgerber, 2011).   
 Length of Aircraft. Compared to the DHC-7, the Q400 has an additional 20 feet of 
fuselage length usable for cargo.  This additional space should be able to accommodate 
more sensor payloads than three for the DHC-7.  In addition, this extra space could 
accommodate future niche sensors such as light detection and ranging (LIDAR) and 
foliage penetration (FOPEN) that are not currently part of the ARL program (see Figure 3 
for the Q400 external dimensions). 
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Figure 3.   Q400 External Dimensions (From Bombardier, 2011) 
1. Potential Advantages of the Q400. 
 Noise Improvement.  The Q in Q400 stands for quiet.  The Q400 has a proprietary 
sound-reduction system called the active noise and vibration suppression (NVS) system.  
This system makes the interior of the aircraft extremely quiet compared to other 
turboprop aircraft, potentially improving the performance of on-board operators.  The 
Q400 is also quieter from the outside.  An aircraft with reduced signatures enhances their 
survivability and increases their probability of detecting and observing target activity.  
Concerning training, aircraft quietness might facilitate training operations by reducing 
noise complaints that could help ensure that local communities do not deny training and 
mission airspace. 
 Life Expectancy.  The design life of the Q400 is 80,000 flight cycles, but 
Bombardier recently extended the lives of its aircraft, including some early Q400 aircraft.  
No Q400s are close to this cycle limit at present, but the potential for life extension 
exists.  Aircraft that use up-to-date technology lower operating costs, a factor the DoD is 
currently pushing for in future acquisitions in order to save more money in the long term 
(Weisgerber, 2011). 
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 Payload Capability.  From the start, the Q400’s design will have the capability to 
facilitate modular sensor bays, which will allow operators to switch out of payloads 
quickly and tailor them to specific missions.   
 Still in Production.  As of April 28, 2011, the production numbers of the Q400s 
stood at 352 aircraft.  Bombardier no longer produces their Q200 and Q300 models due 
to the success of the Q400.  This allows them to concentrate their production resources on 
the Q400 line.     
 Engine power.  The Q400 is a two-engine aircraft, with a single-engine service 
ceiling that is 19,000 feet at 95% of max gross weight.   
 Heads-up Guidance System.  The Q400 has CAT-IIIa capability for increased 
operational ability in inclement weather and has the approval of the Federal Aviation 
Agency (FAA).   
 Existing Modification Strategy.  All modifications to the Q400 must meet military 
specifications and have Supplemental Type Certificates (STC) from the FAA.  An STC, 
issued by the FAA, approves a product (aircraft, engine, or propeller) change. 
More important to the U.S. Army, the STCs will be applicable to all Q400s modified for 
ISR missions.  In addition, Q300 STCs will receive updates for use on the Q400 with 
only minor rework for the installation of radome, electro-optical (EO) and IR sensors.  
This adaptability will lower overall program risk and reduce schedule impact.    
 Single-Engine Service Ceiling.  One of the Q400’s engines is capable of 
providing more significant lift and speed capacity than similar aircraft.  For example, if 
the Q400 were operating at its maximum altitude of 25,000 feet, the service ceiling would 
decrease to 21,374 feet with one engine failure.  In comparison, if the DHC-7 operated at 
its maximum altitude of 18,000 feet, its service ceiling would decrease to 13,000 feet if 
one engine failed (Intelligence and Security Command [INSCOM], 2002).   
F. THE FUTURE OF THE AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE LOW 
PROGRAM 
 Joint Direct-Support Airborne Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
(JDSAISR).  According to the recently published ICD for the JDSAISR, the desired 
outcome of JDSAISR is the operational synchronization of military actions in time and 
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space to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive point (Training and 
Doctrine Command [TRADOC], 2010, p.1).   The ICD will provide a set of capabilities 
that will enable timely, assured, persistent, and responsive airborne ISR support to 
tactical commanders at the Brigade Combat Team/Regimental Combat Team level and 
below (TRADOC, 2010, p.1). 
 JDSAISR’s Concept of Operation.  The JDSAISR’s capabilities will allow 
tactical commanders to focus on their commander’s critical information requirements 
“for the purpose of driving operational synergy…to the lowest appropriate level” 
(TRADOC, 2010, p.1).  In addition, JDSAISR will contribute to the commander’s 
situational understanding through its “unique characteristics of range, flexibility…and 
other key capability attributes” (TRADOC, 2010, p.2).  More specifically, the aerial 
platforms must be able to attack the network by focusing ISR support on the enemy’s 
abilities to move, shoot, communicate, plan, supply, and sustain.   
 JDSAISR must be able to integrate capabilities to conduct find, fix and finish 
support operations in supporting the tactical commander “to attack the threat” 
(TRADOC, 2010, p.2).  The sensors, as part of the ISR package, must provide sufficient 
resolution over desired coverage areas, and they must appropriately match their host 
platform.  In addition, these host platforms (manned and unmanned) must be able to 
provide the requisite attributes for altitude, duration, payload capacity, and infrastructure 
demands. 
 Capabilities Enabled by JDSAISR.  JDSAISR’s capabilities contribute directly to 
answering the commander’s critical information requirements in various scenarios to 
include irregular warfare and major combat operations (TRADOC, 2010, p.1).  See below 
for the specific enabling capabilities planned under JDSAISR:  
• Synchronization of processes, equipment, and training that eliminates gaps 
and provides the right information to the right place at the right time; 
• Networking of an interoperable network that will transport voice, text, data, 
video, and other information; 
• Analytical support that effectively leverages national to tactical tasking, 
processing, exploitation, and dissemination resources; and 
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• Interdependency of ground-based, operational/theater, and strategic/national 
ISR capabilities that provide the necessary foundational and contextual 
information to maximize JDSAISR capabilities (TRADOC, 2010, p.3). 
 JDSAISR Operational View.  The JDSAISR capabilities are a synchronized layer 
of airborne capabilities that include the ARL as an asset that helps the commander his 
critical information requirements.  Individual JDSAISR capabilities cannot alone achieve 
the desired level of performance.  Layering and integrating all ISR capabilities to focus 
on a given problem set helps meet the commander’s mission needs (TRADOC, 2010). 
 JDSAISR capabilities allow the tactical commanders “to attack the threat network 
in the context of the find, fix, finish, exploit, assess, and disseminate (F3EAD) and find, 
fix, track, target, engage, assess (F2T2EA) effects-based targeting process” (TRADOC, 
2010).   
 Figure 4 shows the operational view for JDSAISR.   
 
 
Figure 4.   Operational View of JDSAISR (From TRADOC, 2010, p. 16) 
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 Aerial ISR Layer Strategy.  According to Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
Memorandum 157-09, all services will continue to focus on the integration and 
optimization of sensor capabilities and platforms that possess the attributes of persistence 
and flexibility.  In Figure 4, the various aircraft at the top of the blue circle represent the 
Army’s Aerial Layer of Platforms and Sensors (ALPS) strategy that integrates with 
foundational, ground, other aerial (joint and nontraditional ISR) assets, and space 
capabilities.  The four aerial assets that compose the ALPS strategy include the Enhanced 
Medium-Altitude Reconnaissance Surveillance System (EMARSS), a vertical take-off 
and landing (VTOL) unmanned aerial system (UAS), the Long Endurance Multi-
Intelligence Vehicle (LEMV) UAS system, and the ARL (TRADOC, 2011). 
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III. DHC-7 AND Q400 COMPARISON 
The focus of this chapter is to do a side-by-side comparison of technical 
characteristics of the two aircraft.  More analytical comparisons come later.  For example, 
Chapter 4 contains the performance and cost comparison analyses.  Tables 1–4 present 
the physical differences between the DHC-7 and the Q400. 
Table 1.   Aircraft Dimensions 
Aircraft Dimensions DHC-7 Q400 
Overall Length 81.75 feet 107.7 feet 
Overall Height 26.2 feet 27.4 feet 
Overall Wingspan 93 feet 93.25 feet 
Wing Area 860 feet3 679 feet3 
Wing Aspect Ratio 10 12.8 
Note. Data taken from Viking Air (2001) and Bombardier (2011).  
 
Table 2.   Cabin Dimensions 
Cabin Dimensions DHC-7 Q400 
Cabin Length 39.5 feet 72.5 feet 
Max Cabin Height 6.4 feet 6.4 feet 
Max Cabin Width 8.5 feet 8.2 feet 
Cabin Volume 1910 feet3 2730 feet3 
Cargo Compartment 240 feet3 411 feet3 
Note. Data taken from Viking Air (2001) and Bombardier (2011).  
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Table 3.   Weights and Payload Capability 
Note. Data taken from TRADOC (2002) and Bombardier (2011).  
 
Table 4.   Aircraft Performance 
Aircraft Performance DHC-7 Q400 
Engines 
4 x Pratt & Whitney 
PT6A-50 
2 x Pratt & Whitney  
PW150A 
Total Shaft Horsepower (all 
  engines) 4,480 SHP 10,142 SHP 
Time Between Overhauls (TBO) 5500 hours 10000 hours 
Take-off Distance(ISA, SL, MTOW) 2,240 feet 4580 feet 
Landing Distance (ISA, SL, MLW) 2,160 feet 4,221 feet 
Max Range (ARL payload: max 
 fuel & 45-minute reserve)  1,096 nm 3,152 nm 
Max Cruise Speed 231 knots 352 knots 
Max Endurance Speed (ARL  
 Payload, max fuel & 45 min  
    reserve) 140 knots 222 knots 
Max Endurance Time (ARL 
   Payload, max fuel & 45 min 
   reserve) 7.8 hours 14.2 hours 
Max Operating Altitude 18,000 feet 25,000 feet 
Enroute Rate of Climb (MTOW) 1,510 fpm 2,280 fpm 
One-Engine-Out Rate of Climb 
    (ISA, SL, MTOW) 820 fpm 780 fpm 
Note. Data taken from TRADOC (2002) and Bombardier (2011).  
Weights and Payload  
DHC-7 Q400 
Max Take-Off Weight (MTOW) 44,000 lbs 65,200 lbs 
Max Landing Weight (MLW) 42,000 lbs 62,000 lbs 
Typical Operating Weight 
    Empty (OWE) 27,570 lbs 39,284 lbs 
Max Zero Fuel Weight (MZFW) 39,000 lbs 58,000 lbs 
Max Fuel (with auxiliary tanks)  27,570 lbs 21,724 lbs 
Max Payload 6,275 lbs 18,716 lbs 
Max Passengers (civilian) 54 78 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
1. Assumptions Background  
 In general, we assumed that none of the parameters considered in the analysis 
change over the life cycle of the aircraft.  Annual flight hours, fuel costs, and payloads 
are constant, because there is no high-confidence method to determine these parameters 
in 2020, much less in 2031. 
a. Assumption 1 
  Since the Army has the opportunity to buy brand new Q400s configured to 
its exact specifications, we assume that the Army would purchase the Enhanced High 
Gross Weight (EHGW) version.  The EHGW version maximizes payload capability and 
maximizes performance in high and hot altitudes.  All Q400 specifications in this BCA 
show the EHGW version. 
b. Assumption 2  
  The cost per flight hour is the basis for O&S costs.  The figure for the 
DHC-7 came from a 2010 Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) EO-5 
Business Case Analysis and adjusted data from a Conklin & de Decker report (CdD; 
2011).  The SAIC analysis used data from the Fixed Wing Program Office (FWPO), the 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM), CdD, and from their own calculations.  The 
cost per flying hour ranged from $2,340 to $4,269; for this BCA, we calculated the 
average to be $3,338.  We used this figure for all subsequent calculations using O&S.  
This calculation represents an accurate figure because it is close to the median of the data 
points ($3,295; see Appendix A for more information).  Crew costs are not a 
consideration in this BCA. 
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c. Assumption 3 
  The data that calculated the cost per flight hour to operate the Q400 was 
from the Bombardier (2011) and CdD (2011) documents.  The average figure from 
Bombardier was $2,069, with the adjusted CdD figure of $2,076.  With this data we 
calculated the figure to be $2,072.  For all subsequent calculations using O&S, we used 
$2,072 (see Appendix A for more information).  Crew costs are not a consideration in 
this BCA as they would likely be similar, if not the same. 
d. Assumption 4  
  The current Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) of the ARL fleet will not 
change. Program Manager Fixed Wing (PM FW) forecasted annual hours at 110 hours 
per aircraft per month for the ARL fleet.  This monthly forecast results in 10,560 total 
annual hours for the fleet. 
e. Assumption 5 
  The term mission payload includes the weight of the sensors, the 
infrastructure changes and additions made to the aircraft to support the sensors (including 
wiring, workstations, monitors, and antennas), and personnel operating the mission 
equipment, excluding pilots. 
  The DHC-7 mission payload is 6,275 pounds; in its current configuration, 
it operates at its MTOW specification.     
 
MTOW – Operating Weight Empty (OWE) – Maximum Useable Fuel = Mission payload 
 
  The theoretical Q400 mission payload is 6,000 pounds.  We found this by 
determining the weight of the proposed standard sensor packages and then added in 
infrastructure and support weights.  This calculation probably overestimates the Q400’s 
ARL payload weight, but it ensures a fair comparison to the DHC-7. 
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2. Constraints Background  
 In an effort to limit the scope of this BCA, we only considered one aircraft to 
compare cost and performance against the DHC-7.   
a. Constraint 1 
  Discussions with members of the PM ARES program office and the 
TRADOC Capability Manager for Intelligence Sensors (TCM-IS) led to the conclusion 
that the Q400 was the most competitive aircraft for the ARL mission and, therefore we 
selected it as the focus of this BCA. 
B. PERFORMANCE AND CAPABILITY 
1. Operational Availability 
 Operational availability, also referred to as operational readiness or combat 
readiness, of military equipment is important to ensuring the success of military 
operations.  Operational readiness is the number of days that the equipment is available 
and fully mission capable (FMC) or mission capable (MC), divided by the number of 
days in the reporting period.  The Army’s goal for aircraft is 75% FMC (Army, 2004).  
Commanders must be able to forecast the availability of their equipment with a high 
degree of certainty in order to plan and execute military operations.  The current ARL on 
the DHC-7 airframe has poor reliability, resulting in unexecuted missions and the 
potential denial of warfighter support and crucial decision- making intelligence for 
commanders.  The actual impacts of these coverage gaps are difficult to quantify. 
 United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) has the 
overall responsibility for the ARL fleet of eight aircraft.  The 3rd Military Intelligence 
(MI) Battalion (BN) has three aircraft and the 204th MI BN has four.  CENTCOM 
controls the eighth aircraft (D. Keshel, personal communication, August 16, 2011).  The 
ARL fleet shows recent operational readiness rates of approximately 71% MC from 
February 2011 through July 2011 and 30% FMC from November 2010 through July 2011 
(Cook, 2011).  The rate of 30% FMC is well below the Army’s goal of 75% FMC for 
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aircraft.  From November 2010 through July 2011, the 3rd MI BN reported 0% FMC.  
Even though the airframes and engines were mission capable, the 3rd MI BN could not 
complete its mission due to difficulties with some of the newer mission equipment.  This 
information equates to the ARL fleet being FMC approximately three out of every 10 
flying days and being able to fly a mission about seven of every 10 days.  The poor 
readiness rate severely influences operations.  The 3rd MI BN annually flies only 2,846 
of the 3,900 hours that they plan to fly, resulting in a 73% mission-accomplishment rate 
(Cook, 2011).  The small size of the fleet means that as aircraft receive scheduled and 
unscheduled maintenance, only 10% of missions have a backup aircraft available.  If the 
primary aircraft also goes down for unscheduled maintenance, the possibility of mission 
failure increases, potentially affecting the intelligence customer’s decision-making ability 
(Cook, 2011). 
 The small fleet and operational readiness issues also affect flight training.  Both 
the 3rd MI BN and the 204th MI BN report that their crews would be more proficient at 
their duties if the aircraft had better operational readiness rates or if there were more 
aircraft available.  Additionally, the 3rd MI BN also reports having to deny mission 
support requests and joint training opportunities with the Republic of Korea’s military 
forces due to a lack of available aircraft (Cook, 2011). 
 The Q400 is already in limited use by the government.  The organizations that 
operate them have small fleets, usually consisting of just one or two aircraft.  The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) currently maintains a transport fleet that includes an older 
series-100 Dash-8 and a newer Q400.  The FBI reports that their Q400 is an extremely 
reliable aircraft with an operational readiness rate of 95.5% (W. Lacy, personal 
communication, August 16, 2011).   
 A Bombardier representative also reports that other Q400 fleet operators are 
achieving 98.5% dispatch reliability (J. Gonsalves, personal communication, May 3, 
2011).  Dispatch reliability is the percentage of revenue departures that do not incur a 
delay greater than 15 minutes or a cancellation for technical reasons.  Although there is 
no direct comparison between Army FMC rates and the civilian Q400’s operating rates, 
dispatch reliability is a close indicator.  The MC rate is more accurate than the FMC rate 
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in these circumstances.  Either the aircraft flies the mission or it does not.  Unfortunately, 
there is still likely to be a small margin of error that is impossible to account for because 
the civilian Q400 does not have electronic mission equipment to consider in the dispatch 
reliability rates. 
 A DHC-7 with a 71% MC readiness rate is available only 260 days out of every 
year.  On the other hand, a Q400 with an operational readiness rate of 95.6% (a number 
based on the most restrictive Q400 readiness data points) is available 349 days—an 
increase of 89 days, or about 34%.  Based on these numbers between the aircraft, you 
would need 1.3 DHC-7s per one Q400 to achieve equivalent capabilities.  If the Army 
replaced the existing ARL fleet on a one-for-one basis, based on operational readiness 
alone, a Q400 fleet of eight aircraft could do the work of almost 11 (10.7) DHC-7’ 
ARL’s, a benefit of nearly three additional aircraft (see Appendix B for detailed 
calculations).   
 An alternative interpretation of this data shows that the 34% additional capability 
based on readiness of the Q400 fleet could provide approximately 34% more hours of 
time on station (TOS) than the current ARL fleet. 
2. Capability—Range and Endurance 
 Range and loiter time are both performance measures that are a function of both 
the amount of fuel an aircraft can carry and the aircraft’s efficiency.  An aircraft that can 
carry a large amount of fuel inefficiently is no more useful than a highly efficient aircraft 
that can carry only a small amount of fuel.  The DHC-7-based ARL utilizes its regular 
fuel tanks and has auxiliary tanks called wet wings because they utilize space in the wings 
to carry extra fuel.  The most efficient fuel burn comes at approximately 140 knots, 
allowing the ARL to fly for up to eight hours and travel approximately 1,100 nautical 
miles.  In an effort to maximize their TOS, or loiter time, INSCOM ARL operators 
currently must modify their flying technique and operations, including sacrificing speed 




able to cover an entire period of darkness, but cannot do so with the currently configured 
DHC-7 ARL (Cook, 2011).  Because the current ARL operates at its MTOW, it is unable 
to carry additional fuel, even if it had the space. 
 A new Q400 has the ability to use additional internal or external fuel tanks that 
weigh up to 10,000 pounds, giving it a total of over 21,000 pounds of fuel.  The 
additional 20 feet of interior space allows for the mounting of fuel tanks in the interior of 
the aircraft without sacrificing much mission space.  Another advantage of internal fuel 
tanks is that they minimize drag-producing extrusions on the aircraft and maximize range 
and loiter time.  A Q400 in this configuration, carrying one of the proposed future 6,000-
pound ARL payloads, has a range of over 3,100 nautical miles and a total endurance time 
of 14.2 hours.  This performance almost triples the aircraft’s range capability and is an 
improvement of over 75% in endurance over the current DHC-7-based ARL.  
 This additional range and endurance has immediate, positive mission 
implications.  With sensitive international political alliances and certain countries 
denying the basing of U.S. aircraft in their countries, the Q400 becomes an even more 
attractive option.  Its additional range and endurance allow it to operate in areas where a 
DHC-7 cannot.     
 As Figure 5 shows, a Q400 based in Afghanistan has the range and endurance to 
operate in Iraq, whereas the DHC-7 ARL does not.  This means that if the ARL platform 
were required in both countries simultaneously, the Army would have to establish and 
maintain an ARL logistical capability in each country.  Similarly, a Q400 in the same 
situation could set their base in either country and operate with the efficiency that comes 
with logistical consolidation.  Note that Figure 5 does not take into account the political 
considerations of overflying sovereign territories; it merely illustrates the potential 
benefit that the increased range of the Q400 might have in a given theater.   
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Figure 5.   Q400 Range and Endurance Advantage Over the DHC-7 (Data taken from 
TRADOC, 2002 and Bombardier, 2011).   
Note. DHC-7 (red circle) = 1,096 nm = 1,261 miles / 2 = 631 mile range; Q400 (blue 
circle) = 3,152 nm = 3,625 miles / 2 = 1,812 mile range. 
3. Capability—Maximum Cruise Speed 
 Another capability that additional horsepower provides is cruise speed.  Currently, 
the DHC-7 ARLs operate out of Texas and Korea, and are generally executing steady-
state operations.  However, the units that operate the ARL are a globally deployable asset 
that must be ready to respond to warfighter needs for the ARL’s ISR capabilities (Cook, 
2011).  When these units deploy to support a Brigade Combat Team (BCT), Division, or 
Corps, the maximum cruise speed becomes an important factor.  Regularly planned 
missions do not require excessive speed because the operators conduct planning that 
allows them to account for the required TOS to ensure maximum fuel efficiency.  A re-
tasking is usually for an urgent and developing situation where speed is crucial.  The 
DHC-7 can cruise at up to 231 knots, but it does so at an extreme cost to fuel efficiency.  
The Q400 has a maximum cruise speed of 360 knots, which is approximately 56% faster 
than the DHC-7 and with less impact on its fuel efficiency. 
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a. Operational Mission Scenario 
  The following operational mission scenario highlights the importance of 
speed.  An INSCOM unit deploys to Afghanistan and flies regularly scheduled missions 
in and around Regional Command South.  It is currently over the city of Kandahar in 
Kandahar Province.  A situation develops in Helmand Province just to the west with 
Troops in Contact (TIC), meaning that soldiers are in a direct engagement with the 
enemy.  No other ISR assets are currently in the area.  The ARL receives the task to 
support the TIC and must fly approximately 100 miles (86 nautical miles).  The current 
DHC-7 ARL will take over 22 minutes to get to the target area, but a Q400 would take 
just 14 minutes, an improvement of eight minutes.  When minutes and seconds count, 
eight minutes is an exceptional improvement to the warfighter.  Although this example is 
simple, its message is important.  If the Army continues to conduct operations in varied 
locations, it will always need aerial assets with increased capabilities, such as those of the 
Q400 in this scenario. 
4. Capability—Payload  
 The current ARL payload on the DHC-7 is approximately 6,275 pounds, which 
puts it at its maximum capability and minimizes the possibilities for sensor enhancements 
(L. Ilse, personal communication, April 20, 2011).  The Q400 is capable of payloads of 
over 18,700 pounds, which give it almost 300% more capability than the DHC-71.  The 
Q400’s additional payload comes with an increase of only 36% in operating weight 
empty (OWE), which shows its improved efficiency over the DHC-7 (see Appendix C for 
detailed payload figures). 
 The Q400s are able to carry an additional 10,000(+) pounds of payload more than 
the DHC-7 and they have an extra length of 27 feet (8.23 meters) to carry more items.  As 
described in the JDSAISR document, warfighters are looking for flexibility and enhanced 
capabilities to fill gaps in current ISR collection methods (TRADOC, 2010).  A larger 
and more capable setup within the aircraft provides much more room for future 
                                                 
1 If the Army were to completely utilize the 18,000 plus pounds payload on a Q400, they will sacrifice 
some of the range and endurance advantage. 
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enhancements and upgrades. Obtaining the Q400 is an excellent example of how the 
Army could do value engineering.  In value engineering (VE), value is defined as 
function divided by cost: 
 
 To increase value, function must increase and/or cost must decrease.  One concept 
that offers such increased value is the modular payload bay, already in use by aircraft 
manufacturers, which provides a sensor-dedicated area in the vehicle that allows for plug-
and-play capability.  In the case of the Army’s Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence 
Vehicle (LEMV) (a large hybrid air vehicle that can stay on station for weeks at an 
altitude of 20,000 feet), the modular payload bay provides a 24-foot long bay with 
housings for 12 individual payload modules.  Each module uses an Internet-protocol- 
based interface for easy integration without modification to the mission computer.  This 
interface allows the LEMV to carry different modular payloads that can switch out 
quickly for different operational missions.  In addition, the modular payloads would 
allow for quick modifications upgrades without modifying the platform itself (Heaney, 
2011).  Figure 6 is an example of a modular payload bay.  Note that the actual 
implementation of the modular payload bay onto a Q400 would likely look different and 




   Function 
Cost        
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Figure 6.   Modular Payload Bay Concept on the LEMV (Heaney, 2011) 
 The current DHC-7 ARL-M has three different sensor configurations in payload: 
MTI/SAR, IMINT, and SIGINT.  A possible future Q400-based ARL would have enough 
room to enhance the ARL’s capability by building in the modular payload bay concept 
from the beginning.  Given the added space and performance of the Q400, it should 
provide enough room for up to four or more sensors versus the three available on the 
DHC-7.  These additional sensors would provide users with another asset and support the 
ARL’s flexibility to adjust payloads for specific mission sets within hours not days (L. 
Ilse, personal communication, April 20, 2011) 
 The program manager for ARES, COL Keith Hirschman, envisions the future 
ARL replacement being able to carry large, niche sensors that the other previously 
mentioned platforms within the JDSAISR concept cannot (K. Hirschman, personal 
communication, April 20, 2011).  In addition to allowing rapid change out of an existing 
suite of sensors, the modular payload bay concept also facilitates rapid integration of new 
sensors (M. Popovich, personal communication, April 20, 2011). 
a. Possible Future Payload Configurations 
  The Army TCM-IS office offered three possible payloads for 
consideration for an upgraded ARL platform.  Each of these proposed payloads 
implement sensors that already exist and require minimal additional development.  The 
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sensors will also allow for easy integration in future platforms.  The sensors are tailored 
to a specific mission set defined within the JDSAISR ICD and represent capabilities that 
the current ARL does not have, while also enhancing its existing capabilities.  The 
sensors have all received approval as part of the ARL requirements document (Director, 
Capabilities Integration, Prioritization and Analysis, 2011).  All of these payloads weigh 
less than the 6,275-pound suite of sensors and equipment currently onboard the ARL.  To 
ensure a fair comparison between DHC-7 and Q400 capabilities we estimated 6,000 
pounds to include aircraft modifications, workstations, operators, wiring, and antennas. 
This is likely an overestimation of a new Q400 ARL payload, but it ensures a realistic 
comparison by not overstating the performance of the Q400.  The following section 
contains more details on proposed payloads A, B, and C.  
  Payload A. This payload is suitable for a find mission, also known as a 
persistent area assessment (PAA) mission, which works well with high-endurance 
platforms and provides broad-area sensing to develop enemy communications networks, 
activity, and movement.  These are the potential components of payload A: 
• Ground Moving Target Indication (GMTI)—Phoenix Eye 
o This synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) shows the operator moving 
vehicles in a large area. 
• Conventional SIGINT—Diamondback or Pennantrace 
o This sensor gives the operator the ability to penetrate communications 
networks. 
• Wide-Area Airborne Surveillance Sensor—Constant Hawk, MASIV, or 
ARGUS-IS/IR 
o This sensor is similar in operation to a full motion video (FMV), but 
looks at much larger areas with a lower refresh rate and gives the 
operator the ability to store, rewind, and “fast-forward imagery to 




  Payload B. This payload is suitable for the fix mission, also known as the 
situation development (SID) mission, which receives cues from a variety of sources to 
develop situation and target understanding.  These are the potential components of 
payload B: 
• DMTI Radar—VADER 
o This sensor is similar to GMTI, but has the resolution necessary to 
detect objects smaller than vehicles, such as personnel. 
• LIDAR or High Resolution Color Image Mapping Sensor—PeARL Camera 
o This sensor is an optical remote-sensing technology that can measure 
the distance to, or other properties of, a target by illuminating the 
target with light. 
• Hyperspectral Sensor 
o This sensor is similar in theory to the human eye in that it separates 
visible light; however, hyperspectral imagery divides the spectrum into 
many more bands and allows the operator to see beyond what is visible 
to the human eye.  It increases the ability of the operator to identify 
certain materials that make up a scanned object. 
  Payload C. This payload is suitable for finish operations, also known as 
mission overwatch (MO) operations, which conduct multi-sensor ISR overwatch to 
current operations and can provide direct support to the warfighter on the ground.  These 
are the potential components of payload C: 
• Dual EO/IR FMV with Shortwave IR (SWIR) 
o EO/IR cameras allow the operator to see during the day and night.  
SWIR allows the operator to see in even darker conditions than IR.  
Warfighters frequently request the dual EO/IR camera because it 
provides them with redundant coverage during operations (L. Ilse, 
personal communication, April 20, 2011).  It provides the warfighter 




asset scanning the perimeter of the objective, for example.  Most 
operations currently require two separate platforms to achieve this 
capability. 
• Penetrating Radars—FOPEN, TRACER, Desert Owl, Copperhead 
o These sensors allow the operator to see through obstructions, such as 
dense jungle foliage. 
• Aerial Precision Geo-location (SIGINT) 
o This sensor gives the operator the ability to determine an exact 
location for enemy communications devices. 
  Using the modular payload bay design’s plug-and-play concept, 
commanders can request assets from three basic payloads in numerous possible 
combinations of sensors.  This gives the commanders a wide selection of assets to use in 
intelligence-gathering and observation missions.  Although the weight of proposed future 
ARL payloads is similar to that of the current generation payload, the Q400 can carry this 
payload farther, faster, and more efficiently.  The Q400’s 10,000 pounds of additional 
payload capability provides the Army with a great deal of future flexibility, including 
modification and upgrade options. 
5. Capability—Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL) 
 The design of the DHC-7 developed in the 1970s at a time when the airline 
industry believed that regional city centers would build short take-off fields.  This never 
materialized and there existed limited routes to remote airfields with short runways to 
generate enough traffic to justify the use of a 50-seater (Lenz, 2009).  The DHC-7 can 
take off from fields as short as 689 meters (2,260 feet) and can land on runaways as short 
as 594 meters (1,950 feet).  Although it is a great capability, STOL is not commonly used 
by commercial airlines and will likely not be a requirement for a future ARL (K. 
Hirschman, personal communication, April 20, 2011).  The STOL capability was a 
SOUTHCOM request and is not part of the standard Army mission set.  The DHC-7 is 
capable of operations on unprepared airfields; however, the Army has yet to use this 
capability (D. Keshel, personal communication, August 16, 2011). 
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 The Q400 is not as capable in this respect; it needs 1,469 meters (4,819 feet) at 
MTOW to take off and 1,290 meters (4,232 feet) to land.  This data makes the Q400 
appear less useful due to the limited number of airfields at which it will be able to take 
off and land; however, the Q400 can operate from all Army Class A runways in 
accordance with Army Field Manual 3-04.300, “Appendix C” (Army, 2008).  The Q400 
is also capable of operations on unprepared airfields, which means it has the ability to 
deploy and operate alongside Army expeditionary forces as missions dictate.  In short, 
the Q400’s short field capability is not as good as the DHC-7’s, but it is sufficient for 
Army operations. 
6. Capability—Normal Ceiling and One-Engine-Out Ceiling 
 The DHC-7, when compared to similar aircraft, has power issues.  Its four Pratt & 
Whitney PT6A-50 engines produce 1,120 shaft horsepower (SHP) for a total of 4,480 
SHP at maximum power for take-off.  The Q400 has only two Pratt & Whitney PT150-A 
engines, yet they have a rating of over 5,000 SHP at maximum power for take-off, 
yielding a total of over 10,000 SHP (Bombardier, 2011).  A single PT150-A has more 
horsepower than all four PT6A-50s. 
 The horsepower numbers are meaningful in the context of operating capability. 
Aircraft performance limitations often require drift-down procedures in the existing ARL 
platform.  At an ARL operating weight of 44,000 pounds and in International Standard 
Atmosphere [ISA]) conditions, the ARL platform will descend to approximately 13,000 
feet before it is able to maintain altitude (Viking Air, 2001).  This gradual descent would 
take place over a period of approximately 38 minutes, during which time the aircraft 
would fly close to 86 nautical miles.  The mission must be planned so that the aircraft can 
safely descend without encountering obstacles during the descent or after leveling off at 
13,000 feet.  In operating environments that have large mountain ranges, like Afghanistan 
and South America, certain areas are off limits because the aircraft must remain close 
enough to mountain passes so that it can descend through them if an engine fails.  Failure 
to account for drift-down procedures in mission planning places the safety of the aircraft 
and its crew at high risk. 
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 Using the Q400’s drift-down procedures, Bombardier (2001) calculates that the 
single-engine ceiling of the future theoretical Q400 with an ARL payload at 6,000 pounds 
and fueled for a 10-hour mission would be 20,347 feet (56,000 pounds and ISA).  The 
Q400’s mission-configured; single-engine service ceiling is projected to be higher than 
the four-engine, mission-configured ceiling of the existing ARL platform2. This 
enhanced capability allows the Q400 significantly more flexibility in mission planning. 
 In an AO such as SOUTHCOM planners currently face significant limitations 
because they can plan missions only on the east side of the Andes mountain range due to 
its lower altitude.  Anything to the west is off-limits because if an engine issue were to 
occur, the aircraft and crew would likely be unable to return to the east side of the 
mountain range to make an emergency landing.  This constraint prevents the Army from 
planning ARL operations along almost the entire west coast of South America.  Figure 7 
highlights the limitation of the DHC-7 on a map of South America, and the benefit of the 
Q400 in comparison.  Aircraft performance is restricted in the red areas and unrestricted 
in the green areas.  If the Q400 loses an engine, the aircraft can still fly through most 
mountain passes in the Andes.  Only 46 peaks are above the Q400’s 20,347-foot single-
engine service ceiling, which greatly extends the ISR collection range for the aircraft and 
maximizes the platform’s ability to collect intelligence. 
                                                 




Figure 7.   Operating Restrictions Due to the Andes Mountain Range (Data taken 
from Viking Air (2001), TRADOC (2002) and Bombardier (2001).   
Red shows areas that the platform is unable to operate.  DHC-7 is shown on the left and 
Q400 on the right.   
7. Overall DHC-7 to Q400 Performance and Capability Comparison 
 Figure 8 compares performance metrics for the DHC-7 and Q400. To make this 
comparison meaningful, Figure 8 depicts DHC-7 as the baseline against which to 
compare the Q400.  Therefore, all of the DHC-7’s performances equal one.  The Q400 
performance metrics were compared and displayed as a ratio (see Appendix E for 
detailed calculations).  Based on the performance measures and capabilities identified in 
this BCA, the Q400 is up to three times the aircraft that the DHC-7 is.  The average and 
the median of the performance ratios are 1.84 and 1.53 respectively.  Even the most 




Replacing the eight DHC-7s in the Army’s ARL fleet with eight Q400s would net the 
same performance as approximately 10.4 DHC-7s—a capability increase equivalent to 
adding two aircraft to the ARL fleet. 
 
 
Figure 8.   DHC-7 Versus Q400 Performance Comparison 
C. STANDARD MISSION PROFILE COSTS 
 This BCA examined quantitative and qualitative data from the ARL operators 
within INSCOM.  The units involved included the 204th MI BN stationed at Fort Bliss, 
TX, and the 3rd MI BN stationed in Korea.  Because of their combined feedback, a 
standard mission scenario emerged that allowed for a comparison between the Q400 and 
the DHC-7.  The standard mission for this study consisted of a takeoff from a station and 
a transit of 130 nautical miles (150 miles) to the mission area.  The aircraft will operate at 
a maximum loiter TOS (based on available fuel), and will transit back to the station at 
130-nautical miles with a 45-minute fuel reserve.  This means that the pilots plan to land 
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the aircraft with 45 minutes of fuel remaining.  Figure 9 shows the standard mission 
scenario overlaid on a theoretical Army AO (see Appendix D for detailed calculations). 
 
Figure 9.   Standard Mission Scenario (Data for scenario taken from Cook, 2011). 
1. DHC-7 Standard Mission Profile Cost 
 Although the DHC-7 is capable of faster cruising speeds, real-world units (3rd MI 
BN and 204th MI BN) travel their transit legs at approximately 140 knots and conduct 
their missions at this same speed when they are on station.  The mission speeds flown 
reflect these units’ direct effort to maximize fuel efficiency in order to maximize station 
time.  With a 45-minute reserve, the DHC-7 can stay aloft for approximately seven hours 
and 50 minutes.  The 130-nautical mile transit legs take 55 minutes each at 140 knots so 
the actual TOS is six hours, and it covers 836 nautical miles (for a total of 1,096 nautical 
miles per mission).  The total cost per mission at $3,388 per hour comes to $26,140.  The 
cost per nautical mile in the mission area is $31.26. 
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2. Q400 Standard Mission Profile Cost—Max Endurance 
 When placed into the same mission profile, the Q400 fared significantly better 
with its enhanced performance and fuel economy.  The Q400 burns fuel most efficiently 
at 222 knots, allowing it to arrive at the target area more quickly, while also covering 
more area while on station.  It is useful to look at the Q400’s capability in a maximum-
endurance scenario because the INSCOM operators would like more TOS than what the 
DHC-7 can correctly provide at its maximum.  When configured for maximum endurance 
using internal auxiliary tanks with a 45-minute reserve, the Q400 can remain airborne for 
approximately 14.2 hours.  The Q400 can complete the 130-nautical mile transit legs in 
only 35 minutes, saving over 40 minutes of transit time per mission.  With its increased 
range, the Q400 has close to 13 hours TOS, which means it can cover a whole period of 
darkness.  This endurance is important to flight operators and intelligence customers 
(Cook, 2011). 
 At $2,072 per hour, the total mission cost comes to $29,427, which is more 
expensive than a DHC-7 mission; however, when broken down further, the cost per 
nautical mile is $10.17, less than one-third of the DHC-7’s cost.  Another metric to 
consider is the actual cost per mission hour, which is the cost of the entire mission 
divided by the actual number of hours the ARL is conducting its intelligence mission, or 
TOS.  This metric removes transit time from the equation and gives a more accurate look 
at what the intelligence actually costs.  In this metric, the Q400 costs $2,259 per mission 
hour, which is almost half of the DHC-7’s cost of $4,377 per mission hour. 
3. Q400 Standard Mission Profile Cost—Most Likely Use Scenario 
 The maximum endurance configuration allows for potential surge capability, but 
an aircraft is rarely used to its maximum capability.  For pilots and operators conducting 
regular missions, a 14-hour flight, plus pre-brief time, preparation time, and de-brief 
time, could disrupt mandatory crew rest time and is likely unsustainable for long periods.  
Therefore, it is important for this BCA to establish a most-likely-use scenario to compare 
the DHC-7 against the Q400. 
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 Feedback from INSCOM operators helped develop this scenario, who said an 
ideal total mission time would be 10 hours (Cook, 2011).  Given the same 130-nautical 
mile transit legs used in the DHC-7 scenario, the flight time of 10 hours leaves almost 
nine hours of TOS, which makes use of the Q400’s enhanced capabilities and allows it to 
cover a period of darkness.  A 10-hour mission costs $20,723, which is over $5,000 less 
per mission than the DHC-7.  The Q400 costs just $2,347 per mission hour versus 
$4,377, and just $10.57 per nautical mile covered versus $31.26. 
4. INSCOM Demand for TOS and Number of Sorties Required 
 The current demand for ARL use helps identify how the increased performance 
and capability of the Q400 translates into fleet-wide efficiencies.  The subsequent 
paragraphs compare the TOS of the DHC-7 and Q-400.    
 PM FW predicts that the ARL fleet will fly 110 hours per aircraft per month, 
which equates to 10,560 hours annually (Lee, 2011).  Given current transit times with the 
DHC-7, the 10,560 hours flown delivers approximately 8,055 hours of TOS and requires 
1,349 sorties.  As stated earlier we define TOS as actual mission hours where the ARL is 
performing an intelligence mission. 
 Using the most-probable-use scenario and the current INSCOM demand for TOS, 
this BCA found that with a fleet of Q400s, the Army could accomplish the demand for 
8,055 hours of TOS in just 912 sorties for a total of 9,124 annual flight hours (see 
Appendix F for calculations).  This potential reduction in flight hours means more 
savings in O&S costs. 
5. Results 
 Beyond performance metrics, we also considered overall efficiency differences.  
As with the capability and performance metrics above, we used the same methodology to 
analyze the efficiencies of the Q400 against the baseline of the DHC-7.  The DHC-7’s 
performance is represented as one with the Q400 displayed as a ratio.  The most-
probable-use scenario performances prevent the skewering of results and provide an 
accurate and realistic view of the possible Q400 advantages (see Appendix E for detailed 
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calculations).  As shown in Figure 10, the Q400 can complete the current ARL mission, 
including INSCOM’s TOS requirements, in just 68% of the sorties that the DHC-7 
requires.  110 flying hours per month per aircraft means that each ARL unit is able to 
provide daily coverage to intelligence users.   
 The Q400’s hourly operating cost is 62% of the DHC-7’s, and its cost per nautical 
mile covered is just 34% of the DHC-7’s.  Finally, to cover the same INSCOM demand, 
the Q400’s 2011 annual O&S cost would be approximately 54% of the DHC-7’s.  The 
Q400 brings multiple efficiencies to the operator and is overall a more affordable aircraft 
to operate, even without its enhanced capabilities.  Even the most conservative estimates 
of the Q400’s efficiency show that the Q400 does the job at 68% of the cost of the DHC-
7. 
 
Figure 10.   DHC-7 Versus Q400 Standard Mission Efficiencies 
 Using the VE model to examine performance and cost, the same performance and 
cost findings can be input into the value equation (Value = Function / Cost) seen below.  
We use the increased performance number as our metric for function, and the cost ratio as 
our metric for cost.  Even using the most conservative figures, the results show that the 
Q400 is 1.3 times the aircraft that the DHC-7 is and does the job at 68% of the cost.   
   
 
    The Q400’s Value =  
1.30 x the performance of the DHC-7 
 .68 x the operating cost of the DHC-7 




  The Q400’s Value = 1.91 times the value of the DHC-7 
 
 This BCA concludes that in terms of value, the Q400 is almost twice the aircraft 
of the DHC-7.  By replacing its DHC-7s with Q400s, the Army would essentially double 
the value of the current ARL fleet. 
D. RETURN ON INVESTMENT (ROI) 
1. ROI 1 
a. One-Off Repair Parts and Cannibalization 
  Increasing maintenance costs for spare parts are a major concern facing 
DHC-7 fleet operators.  Two factors influence these high maintenance costs.  First, the 
production line for the aircraft stopped in 1988; and second, De Havilland Canada only 
produced 113 total aircraft and approximately half of these aircraft are still flying (CH-
Aviation, 1998–2011).  These factors make spare parts hard to find and, therefore, 
expensive.  In addition, De Havilland Canada no longer exists so it is difficult to obtain 
digital drawings that are transferrable to Computer-Aided Drawing (CAD) and 
Computer-Aided Manufacturing (CAM).  If a third party vendor must make a part for the 
DHC-7, the vendor will have to reverse engineer that part into CAD/CAM, which, again, 
will make it expensive to produce (C. Wantuck, personal communication, May 2, 2011). 
  Approximately 10 years ago, the ARL PM faced the issue of buying parts, 
specifically propeller hubs that were no longer in production.  As a result, the ARL PM 
approached a civilian contractor to make these parts as a special order.  The contractor 
would not consider producing these parts unless the purchase was for a bulk order of at 
least 65 units.  The ARL PM then approached every civilian DHC-7 operator in the world 
in an attempt to  spread the  cost of  buying so many propeller hubs.   Although this was a  
creative attempt to solve the DHC-7’s maintenance problem, the Army still had to 
purchase 40 propeller hubs when they only needed a “handful” (D. Keshel, personal 
communication, August 16, 2011). 
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  The Army is facing this same scenario again in 2011.  The analog gauges 
found in the DHC-7 cockpits are no longer available and are becoming extremely 
expensive and time consuming to repair.  As a result, the Army may have to modernize 
all of the DHC-7 cockpits in its ARL fleet with new digital gauges.  The approximate 
cost is $2.8 million (D. Keshel, personal communication, August 16, 2011). 
  An alternative method of obtaining parts is by sourcing them from other 
identical aircraft, a process commonly referred to as cannibalization.  The small 
production numbers for the DHC-7 mean that the pool of source aircraft is shallow, 
making the practice of cannibalization difficult, time consuming, and expensive.  Another 
challenge of maintaining the DHC-7 is that there is competition with other DHC-7 
operators to obtain the same limited pool of repair parts. 
  A Scandinavian entity recently purchased an Israeli DHC-7 just for its 
parts.  When a product line resorts to cannibalization to keep it running, it is essentially at 
the end of its life and the sustainment costs begin to peak (C. Wantuck, personal 
communication, May 4, 2011).  Since 1996, the inefficiency of cannibalization has added 
millions of hours to maintenance personnel’s workload (Government Accounting Office 
[GAO], 2001).  Instead of a two-step process of removing the old part and replacing it 
with a new part, cannibalization requires three steps: remove the old part from the 
operational aircraft, remove the donor part from the donor aircraft, and then install the 
donor part on the operational aircraft. 
  If the donor aircraft is also an operational aircraft, there is the need for a 
fourth step, the installation of the new part onto the donor aircraft to make it operational 
again.  Cannibalization can literally take twice the amount of time as a regular repair 
because there is the removal of the part and then the re-installation of that part twice, 
once into the nonmission capable aircraft and then eventually the cannibalized aircraft 
(GAO, 2001).  In addition, because broken parts are replaced with used parts,  
cannibalizations do not restore a component to its full projected life expectancy, but 
instead, increase the chance that the same component will again break down prematurely 
(Worra, 2000). 
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  The problems with the DHC-7 fleet have real-world implications.  In 
2010, the autopilot controller failed on one of the 3rd MI BN ARLs.  The maintenance 
contractor that works with the Army maintenance team was able to source a previously 
used controller from a DHC-7 that operated in Yemen.  The part did not have a traceable 
maintenance history and, as a result, it was not serviceable.  The unit’s only other option 
was to send out the original, failed controller for repair (Swickard, 2011).  There was no 
projected date of return and as a result, the aircraft was unable to fly for an extended 
period, leaving their intelligence customers without service.   
  The Q400 does not have, and is not likely to have, the same problems as 
the DHC-7.  There are over 1,000 Dash-8s in operation and over 350 of them are Q400s. 
Additionally, the production line for the Q400 remains open.  It is important to note that 
Bombardier no longer produces its Q200 and Q300 (smaller versions of the Q400), 
devoting its production resources to the more popular Q400 (J. Gonsalves, personal 
communication, May 5, 2011).  The Army has the opportunity to buy new aircraft as 
opposed to buying used. 
b. Life Cycle Landings and Time Between Overhaul (TBO) 
  The Q400 appears to be a better design that uses modern technology, 
materials, and construction methods.  The DHC-7 has a rating of 60,000 life cycle 
landings compared to the Q400’s rating of 80,000 (Bombardier, 2011).  The engines on 
the DHC-7 have a time between overhaul (TBO) of 5,500 hours, at which time each of 
the four engines must receive inspection and overhauling.  The Q400 has a TBO of 
10,000 hours (Bombardier, 2011).  With almost double the time between overhauls and 
with only two engines, the Q400 requires just 27.5% of the DHC-7 overhaul workload, 
equating to reduced maintenance costs. 
c. DHC-7 20-Year Life Cycle Costs 
  The lifecycle costs (LCC) calculation in this BCA looks at the per-hour 
flying cost of each aircraft, which is the basis for future O&S costs.  Within the DoD, 
O&S costs account for approximately two-thirds of the overall defense budget 
 43 
(Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 2007).  Due to the O&S costs being such a large 
portion of the DoD budget, serious consideration must be made to finds ways to decrease 
unnecessary spending.  For the DHC-7 ARL, these costs include operational fuel, 
airframe maintenance, and engine maintenance.  For future budget planning, the Army 
should factor in increases to O&S costs associated with the lifecycle of the aircraft.   
  To determine whether it would be prudent to calculate increases to DHC-7 
O&S costs, we looked to the aging KC-135 Stratotanker for a comparison.  The Air 
Force’s KC-135 fleet is approaching an average service-life age of 45 years, a figure that 
is well beyond its initial design life.  During the height of the Cold War, the replacement 
of most aircraft fleets occurred at approximately 20 years, but today the fleets have a life 
expectancy beyond this 20-year mark (Dixon, 2005).  Although modifications and 
refurbishments to the fleets assist in maintaining their reliability, no one knows the 
sustainability and maintainability implications of operating aircraft that are this old 
(Bryant, 2007).  Estimates on the increasing costs, over and above inflation, for the KC-
135 range from 1% to 6.5% annually and come from different agencies, including the 
United States Air Force and the Defense Science Board.  Given the fact that the average 
age of an Army DHC-7 is over 28 years and that the number of KC-135s and Boeing 
707s (the KC-135’s civilian equivalent) is far greater than the number of DHC-7s that 
were ever in service, it is likely that the ARL might incur similar, if not more, O&S cost 
increases. 
  In this case, the LCC calculation looked at the current year, 2011, and 
calculated the cost of maintaining the DHC-7 ARL over the next 20 years.  We used a 
figure of 5% over and above inflation to calculate DHC-7 ARL O&S cost increases.  Five 
percent is a conservative number given the small fleet size compared to the KC-
135/Boeing 707.   
  Using the 10,560 annual hours as the basis for our calculation, we found a 
LCC of $157 million per ARL, for a total fleet LCC of approximately $1.26 billion 
(Appendix G).  The $157 million figure per aircraft is similar to the number reported in 
an SAIC EO-5 study (2010), which concluded that the status quo 20-year LCC of the 
DHC-7 was $126 million per aircraft.  SAIC used a different method to calculate the 
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LCC, yet both of these studies concluded with similar figures, confirming the results of 
this BCA.  With a 2.5% inflation rate included into the calculation, it increases O&S 
costs by 7.5% per year in future dollars.  The result is the fleet’s LCC is over $1.67 
billion, or $209 million per aircraft in future dollars. 
d. Q400 20-Year Life Cycle Costs 
  This BCA then examined the Q400 with slightly different assumptions 
than the DHC-7.  First, the increase for O&S costs stayed at zero because the Army 
would be purchasing brand-new aircraft. Assuming that the Army replaced each DHC-7 
ARL with a Q400 at a cost of $31 million per aircraft and outfitted each with a 
customized ISR suite costing $19 million, the total cost of each aircraft was $50 million.  
Replaced on a one-for-one basis, the total acquisition cost, or investment cost, for the 
new Q400 ARL fleet would be $400 million.  The acquisition cost is also part of the O&S 
costs for the Q400, which is approximately 38% cheaper to operate per flight hour due to 
its more efficient engines and design.   
  We also accounted for the number of annual required flight hours.  Based 
on the current OPTEMPO forecast for a demand of 8,055 TOS hours, and using the 10-
hour mission assumption, the Q400 requires only 9,124 flight hours annually.  The 
calculations produced a LCC total of $797 million, or just over $99 million per aircraft in 
2011 dollars (see Appendix G for detailed calculations). 
e. 20-Year Life Cycle Cost Results 
  The results of these calculations of 20-year LCC means that replacing the 
current ARL fleet with Q400s is 18% cheaper than staying with the DHC-7 fleet and 
yields a cost avoidance savings of over $462 million over the next 20 years.  This figure 
also assumed that the DHC-7 would receive no additional upgrades in the next two 
decades.  Figure 11 is a break-even analysis graph and shows that by year 13 (2024), the 
upfront investment cost of eight new Q400s will be paid off and the fleet will continue to 
be less expensive to operate than the current DHC-7 fleet. 
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Figure 11.   DHC-7 and Q400 Cumulative Life Cycle Costs (in 2011 Dollars) and 
Payback Period (Data taken from Bombardier (2011), SAIC (2010) and CdD 
(2011))  See Appendix G for calculations. 
f. 20-Year Life Cycle Costs With Additional Annual Flying Hours 
  The Army has contracted out the maintenance of the ARL fleet to a 
private contractor and pays for services required to keep the aircraft flying for up to 125 
hours per month, per aircraft (D. Keshel, personal communication, August 16, 2011), 
which adds up to 12,000 hours per year.  Presumably, the Army would like the capability 
to fly up to 12,000 hours a year, since that is what they are paying for.  By assuming 
12,000 annual flying hours, which is more than the forecasted OPTEMPO, the LCC  
structure changes.  An estimate of 12,000 annual flying hours for the DHC-7 equates to 
9,154 hours of TOS delivered.  The Q400 can deliver the same amount of TOS in just 
10,368 annual hours, versus the 12,000 hours for the DHC-7. 
  The DHC-7 has an LCC of over $1.43 billion, or over $178 million per 
aircraft in 2011 dollars.  The Q400 fleet’s LCC is $851 million, or approximately $106 
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million per aircraft.  Upgrading the fleet to the Q400 saves the Army over half a billion 
dollars over 20 years and costs less than 60% of the LCC the Army would pay to 
maintain the current DHC-7 fleet.  In this situation, we calculated the break-even point to 
occur in just 12 years, based on what the Army is currently paying for in contract support.  
When the calculation is made based on the number of annual hours that the Army 
currently pays for, the break-even point occurs in just 12 years (2023), as shown in 
Figure 12 (see Appendix H for detailed calculations). 
 
Figure 12.   Cumulative Life Cycle Costs (in 2011 Dollars) and Payback Period (Data 
take from Bombardier (2011), SAIC (2010) and CdD (2011)).  See Appendix H 
for calculations. 
2. ROI 2 – Net-Present Value and Internal Rate of Return 
 In addition to analyzing the life cycle costs and break-even points, this BCA also 
analyzed the potential net present value (NPV) and internal rate of return (IRR) of 
purchasing the Q400s.  The NPV looks at future cash flows and uses the time value of 
money to appraise the present value of long-term projects.  This method requires the use 
of a discount rate, which represents the opportunity cost.  This BCA used a discount rate 
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of 2.1%, which is recommended by the Office of Management and Budget for a 20-year 
project (The White House, 2011).   
 Using the assumption of 110 hours per month per aircraft, the NPV of the 2011 
$400 million Q400 investment is over $268 million.  Due to the positive NPV, we 
recommend that the DoD accept this investment.  In addition, the IRR is a positive 6.9%, 
which represents the Army’s potential return on this investment.   
 Using the estimate of 125 hours per month per aircraft, there is an even larger 
positive NPV.  Based on this estimate, the NPV is almost $360 million, and the IRR is 
8.3%.  If the newly acquired aircraft flew additional hours, the value of this potential 
investment would increase, making it more fiscally sound and prudent. 
3. Sensitivity Analysis 
 Two major assumptions made earlier in this BCA are the annual number of hours 
flown and the percentage at which O&S costs will increase.  Using these assumptions, we 
conducted a sensitivity analysis to see how the calculations would change if we adjusted 
these assumptions.  In the subsequent pages we present a series of figures that highlight 
the results of the sensitivity analysis.   
 For Figures 13 and 14, we retained the original assumptions of annual hours 
staying at PM FW’s estimate of 10,560 and used the upper bound of 12,000 hours, the 
amount of hours the Army is paying for through contractor support.  We present a low 
estimate using an O&S increase assumption of just 2%, as well as the base case of 5% 
and then the upper bound of 8%.  For Figures 15 and 16, we use a range of annual fleet 
hours down to 6,000 and compare the total fleet LCC of each platform, as well as the 
IRRs. 
 Figure 13 shows that using the 10,560-hour assumption, an O&S increase 
assumption of 2% for the DHC-7 still yields LCC savings.  The Q400 LCC per aircraft at 
10,560 hours is $99.6M while the LCC for the DHC-7 is $113.6M.  At the upper bound 
of an 8% O&S cost increase, because we assume that the O&S costs will not increase for 
the new Q400, its LCC stays the same at $99.6M, while the DHC-7 is $222.2M, almost 




Figure 13.   Per Aircraft 10,560 Annual Hour LCC using 2% through 8% O&S 
Increase Adjustment (Data taken from Bombardier (2011), SAIC (2010) and CdD 
(2011)).  See Appendix I for calculations. 
 Figure 14 shows the same trend, when using the upper bound of annual flight 
hours to 12,000.  At the low end of 2% increase in O&S costs, the Q400 LCC is $106.4M 
while the DHC-7 is $129.1M.  At the high-end, assuming an 8% increase, the Q400 LCC 
remains at $106.4M and the DHC-7 increases significantly to $252.5M, over double the 
LCC in 2011 dollars. 
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Figure 14.   Per Aircraft 12,000 Annual Hour LCC using 2% through 8% O&S 
Increase Adjustment (Data take from Bombardier (2011), SAIC (2010) and CdD 
(2011)).  See Appendix I for calculations. 
 Figure 15 presents the entire fleet costs using a complete range of assumptions; 
from 6,000 annual flight hours and a 2% O&S cost increase to 12,000 flight hours and an 
8% O&S increase.  On the low end, if the Army believes that it will fly the ARL about 
half as much as it does now, and uses a 2% increase in O&S, continuing to fly DHC-7 
would make sense economically as the fleet LCC of the DHC-7 is $516.4M versus the 
Q400’s LCC of $625.5M.  However, at 7,000 annual hours and using an O&S 
assumption of 3%, the Q400 investment begins to be a better investment.  The Q400’s 
fleet LCC would now be $663.1M versus the DHC-7’s $670.1M.  Also displayed in 
Figure 15 are the BCA’s base case scenarios of 10,560 and 12,000 hours using a 5% 
O&S increase.  On the high end, using 12,000 hours and an 8% O&S cost increase 
assumption, the Q400 advantage becomes more pronounced.  The DHC-7’s fleet LCC 
would be over $2.02 billion, while the Q400’s would be $851.2M.  
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Figure 15.   ARL Fleet LCC Range with Various Assumptions (Data take from 
Bombardier (2011), SAIC (2010) and CdD (2011)).  See Appendix I for 
calculations. 
 Figure 16 takes into account the time-value of money and shows the IRR of the 
Q400 investment using a complete sensitivity analysis.  On the lower left-hand side of the 
graph, we see that using the assumptions of 6,000 annual flight hours with O&S increases 
of 2 to 3%, the IRR is low and in some instances negative.  2011 OMB guidance states 
that a 20-year project should use 2.1% as the discount rate, which means IRR must be 
2.1% or greater to show a positive NPV project and is represented on the graph by a 
dotted line.  Anything less than 2.1% is a poor investment and anything greater is a good 
investment.  For example, when assuming 10,000 annual flight hours and a 4% O&S cost 
increase, this would net the Army with a positive 5% IRR.  The 5% IRR would also 
occur with 8,000 annual flight hours and a 5.5% O&S cost increase. Given that PM FW 
uses the figure of 110 hours per month per aircraft (10,560 total hours annually), using 
the vertical 10,560 hours line is sensible.  From Figure 16, we can conclude that any 
combination of O&S and annual hour assumptions that yield an IRR 2.1% or greater 
represents a positive NPV for the Army, making the Q400 a worthwhile investment. 
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Figure 16.   IRR on Q400 Investment with Various Assumptions (Data taken from 
Bombardier (2011), SAIC (2010) and CdD (2011)).  See Appendix I for 
calculations. 
* Baseline Assumptions 
 
 In conclusion, the Q400 is a good investment unless the Army believes that the 
DHC-7 fleet will remain supportable and that there will be relatively modest ARL 
OPTEMPOs in the years to come.  If we add the superior performance of the Q400, the 
case for the new aircraft is even stronger. 
 
X*                   X* 
 52 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 53 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The Army would gain cost, performance, future capability, and upgradability 
benefits if it replaced its aging DHC-7 ARL fleet with the new Q400 aircraft.  In terms of 
readiness rates alone, a newer aircraft makes sense due to its increase in operational 
availability.  In a one-for-one comparison of performance, the Q400 equates to at least 
1.3 DHC-7s and performs at just 68% of the cost.  In terms of overall value to the Army 
and the intelligence user, the Q400 delivers almost twice the value of a DHC-7.   
 It does not make economic sense for the Army to continue spending money on the 
DHC-7.  The DHC-7 is an old and inefficient aircraft that the Army should consider 
retiring due to rising O&S costs.  Although there are upfront investment costs associated 
with replacing the ARL fleet, the Army will experience significant O&S savings in future 
years.  Using conservative estimates based on the DHC-7’s current average of 10,560 
flight hours per year and the TOS that it delivers, the Army will save almost a half billion 
dollars over the next 20 years if it upgrades the ARL fleet to Q400s. The investment will 
pay for itself after just 13 years.  After conducting a sensitivity analysis, we conclude that 
unless the Army significantly decreases annual flight hours and uses a very low O&S 
increase assumption, the Q400 provides a positive NPV and therefore represents an 
excellent investment. 
 Using the baseline assumptions, the positive NPV of the Q400 investment has a 
value of over $268 million and would produce a 6.9% IRR.  In addition to the economic 
advantages of the Q400, the Army would also gain huge performance benefits.  The 
Q400 is faster, can carry more, and can fly longer in a better flight envelope than the 
current ARL.   
 Finally, if the Army is going to continue upgrading its ISR sensor suites, it does 
not make sense to continue upgrading yesterday’s technology. The Army, and, therefore, 
the warfighter, would benefit more from an investment in new sensors that provide the 
latest levels of capability, modularity, and upgradeability.  These sensors will provide 
immediate benefits to the warfighter and to intelligence customers in the form of 
customizable payloads.  The next logical argument might be that the Army could save 
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even more money by buying fewer Q400-based ARLs.  However, as former Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen stated, as a guest lecturer at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in 2010, “Performance versus numbers logic only goes so far—the 
Services should be extremely careful with significant reductions in their fleets, because 
one platform can only be in one place at one time.”   
 The Army should be careful, if it decides to reduce the ARL fleet, because this 
fleet must continue to support two major commands (SOUTHCOM and PACOM) in two 
separate parts of the world, while also still being able to execute its mission as a globally 
deployable ISR asset.  The JDSAISR ICD identifies the future of airborne ISR, and the 
Q400 appears to be an excellent match for enabling the success of the JDSAISR’s future 
missions.  The Q400’s economic benefits and performance advantages make it a sound 
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